The Austrian School on Happiness and Relational Goods by Antonio Magliulo
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche 





































Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università degli Studi di Firenze 






The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in the working paper series are those 
of the authors alone. They do not represent the view of Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, 



























1.  Introduction 
The paradox of happiness, that is the evidence that, beyond certain limits, the increasing 
income does not affect happiness, as it is perceived by individuals, has conquered both the front 
pages of authoritative scientific literature and the covers of  influential magazines. D. Kahneman, 
Nobel Prize for Economics in 2002, has tried to make happiness measurable. The authoritative 
British magazine The Economist has dedicated the cover of the latest issue of 2006 to “Happiness 
(and how to measure it)”; the leading article starts with these words: “Capitalism can make a 
society rich and keep it free. Don’t ask it to make you happy as well” (The Economist 2006). 
The first controversial question among economists is: can (or must) economics deal with 
happiness?  Can  we  consider  the  “goods”  that  are  likely  to  improve  individual  well-being  or 
happiness as a part of economics? 
An increasing number of scholars answer in an affirmative way. Some of them, as we will 
see, even state that political economy was born, in the 18
th century, as the science of public 
happiness, inquiring directly into the relationship between material and spiritual well-being. It is 
only later that it becomes the science of wealth, presuming that material welfare contributes, 
indirectly, to increase public happiness. Finally, it becomes the science of rational choice that 
considers  the  behaviour  of  men  when  they  possess  few  means  for  alternative  purposes. 
Marginalism,  according  to  this  interpretation,  breaks  the  thin  link  between  economics  and 
happiness. Human relationships are in fact considered just a way to attain goods appearing as 
needs. The good is the object of the relationship, never the relationship itself. In the opinion of 
these scholars, happiness largely depends exactly  on non-instrumental, either pure or  genuine 
human  relationships,  that  they  define  “relational  goods”.  The  good  is  in  other  words  the 
relationship itself: for instance, the relationships between parents and children, among friends, 
among  the  members  of  an  association  or  a  community.  Marginalism,  not  recognizing  the 
economical nature of pure relationships, would have prevented  economics to inquire into the 
subject of happiness and to explain its paradoxes. 
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This research intends to show how, at the time of marginalism, thanks to those very Austrian 
economists who led Robbins to write the epistemological statute of modern economics, the most 
important attempt to establish if and in what sense relational goods are economic goods is made. 
The work is structured as follows. In par. 2, I introduce Menger’s theory of relational goods. 
In par. 3, I consider Böhm-Bawerk’s one and the epilogue of their attempt. In par. 4, I deal with 
Wicksteed and Robbins’ theory. At this point, the reader will perceive a little gap in time and 
space. Wicksteed shows a surprising affinity with the ideas of the Austrian economists and affects 
Robbins’ methodology, which becomes mainstream. In the end, I explain what, in my opinion, is 
the historical meaning of the Austrian theory of relational goods, that is how it is situated in the 
history of the relationships between economics and happiness
1. 
 
2.  The Theory of Relational Goods by Carl Menger of 1871 
In  1871  Carl  Menger  publishes  Grundsätze  der  Volkswirthschaftslehre  (Principles  of 
economics) a milestone of marginalism
2. In the first chapter, dedicated to “The General Theory of 
the Good”, he openly considers the question whether human relationships are economic goods. He 
writes: “Of special scientific interest are the goods that have been treated by some writers in our 
discipline as a special class of goods called “relationships.” In this category there are firms, good-
will, monopolies, copyrights, patents, trade licenses, authors’ rights, and also, according to some 
writers,  family  connections,  friendship,  love,  religious  and  scientific  fellowships,  etc”  (Menger 
1871 [2004]: 54).  
As we can see, relational goods (family, friendship, love), and intellectual property rights 
(copyrights) are included. The scholars who are referred to are Hermann, Roscher, Schäffle, that is 
authoritative representatives of the Historical School aiming at an ethic dimension of economics. In 
particular, Menger writes that in 1832 Hermann “includes a large number of relationships under the 
concept of external goods (relationships of hospitality, love, family, gainful employment, etc.) and 
distinguishes them from material goods and personal services as a special category of goods”; in 
1856 Roscher “counts the state among ‘relationships’”, and in 1867 Schäffle subdivides goods into 
“things, personal services and rights” (Menger 1871 [2004]: 288)
 3. 
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According to Menger, Hermann would be the first one to include, besides tangible objects 
and labor services, a third class of goods represented by human relationships. However, if even 
Schäffle, who is the best theorist (according to Menger), finds it surprising that these goods can be 
considered economic goods, it derives from a dominating mentality that leads to conceive as goods 
just  tangible  objects  and  labor  services.  Menger  writes:  “Nevertheless,  if  the  theorist  who  has 
devoted himself most closely to this topic admits that the classification of these relationships as 
goods has something strange about it, and appears to the unprejudiced eye as an anomaly, there 
must, in my opinion, be a somewhat deeper reason for such doubts than the unconscious working of 
the materialistic bias of our time which regards only material and forces (tangible objects and labor 
services) as things and, therefore, also as goods” (Menger 1871 [2004]: 54). 
In order to establish if and in what sense human relationships are economic goods, we need 
a general theory of goods. And it is exactly in the light of a new general theory of goods that 
Menger evaluates the nature of human relationships. 
To consider something as a good four elements are simultaneously required. Firstly, there 
must be a need that  can be satisfied by something  (for example the necessity to  recover from 
malaria). Secondly, the thing must be suitable to satisfy the need (quinine can heal from malaria). 
Thirdly, men must recognize the suitability of the thing to satisfy the need (china bark was not a 
good,  before  its  therapeutical  abilities  were  discovered).  Finally,  the  good  must  be  available 
(quinine is not a good for a country that cannot afford it). 
The good becomes again a “thing” if one of the four requirements is missing. For example, 
quinine  returns  to  being  a  thing  if  malaria  is  won.  Eventually,  a  good  acquires  an  economic 
dimension when it is scarce compared to the needs it is due to satisfy. Water becomes an economic 
good when it is not sufficient to satisfy various and alternative needs: to quench thirst, to irrigate, 
wash, and so on. 
At this point, a problem of rational choice about the destination of a scarce resource arises. 
Economics just deals with economic goods, that is both useful and scarce. But scarcity is a relative 
concept.  It  derives  from  a  comparison  between  subjective  goods  and  needs.  A  good  becomes 
economic when it is scarce and returns to be simply a good when scarcity fails. 
Menger notes that the classical distinction between tangible objects and labor services (or 
immaterial services) is restrictive. There are “actions” and also “inactions” that, although not labor 
services, are useful and sometimes acquire an economic value. A customer who usually applies to a 
shop  performs  an  action  useful  for  the  shopkeeper,  not  requiring  any  labor  activity.  Customer 
goodwill becomes for the shopkeeper an immaterial good that he can sell along with the material 
goods  composing  the  shop.  Customer  goodwill  is  therefore  an  economic  good  separated  from   4 
material  goods,  belonging  to  the  class  of  “useful  human  activities”.  A  country  doctor  who,  on 
retiring,  leaves  the  only  other  doctor  in  a  position  of  monopoly,  does  a  useful  action  for  his 
colleague, not involving any working activity: 
 
That someone buys commodities from me, or uses my legal services, is certainly no 
labor  service on his part, but it is nevertheless an action beneficial to me. That a well-
to-do doctor ceases the practice of medicine in a small country town in which there is 
only one other doctor in addition to himself can with still less justice be called  a 
labor service. But it is certainly an inaction of considerable benefit to the remaining 
doctor who thereby becomes a monopolist.  
  Whether a larger or smaller number of persons regularly performs actions that 
are beneficial to someone (a number of customers with respect to a merchant, for 
instance) does not alter the nature of these actions. And whether certain inactions on 
the part of some or all of the inhabitants of a city or state which are useful to someone 
come about voluntarily  or through legal compulsion (natural or legal monopolies, 
copyrights, trade marks, etc.), does not alter in any way the nature of these useful 
inactions. From an economic standpoint, therefore, what, are called clienteles, good-
will, monopolies, etc., are the useful actions or inactions of other people, or (as in the 
case of firms, for example) aggregates of material goods, labor services, and other 
useful actions and inactions (Menger 1871 [2004]: 54-55, original italics). 
 
The same applies to relationships of friendship and love. They are actions and inactions 
useful for someone. If available, they are goods in an economic sense: 
 
Even relationships of friendships and love, religious fellowships, and the like, consist 
obviously of actions or inactions of other persons that are beneficial to us. 
  If, as is true of customer good-will, firms, monopoly rights, etc., these useful 
actions or inactions are of such a kind that we can dispose of them, there is no reason 
why we should not classify them as goods, without finding it necessary to resort to 
the  obscure  concept  of  “relationships,”  and  without  bringing  these  “relationships” 
into contrast with all other goods as a special category (Menger 1871 [2004]: 55). 
 
 
Let us stress the phrase “beneficial to us”. Menger recognizes the nature of goods in an 
economic sense to human relationships, but he seems to consider them as one way actions and 
inactions: the customer choosing his lawyer, the doctor who, retiring, fosters his colleague, etc. 
Examples on friendship and love are not directly mentioned, although it is not difficult to evict them 
from Menger’s theory. The mother embracing her son performs an action beneficial to him, not a 
working activity. A boy going to see a friend does something useful for him, not a working activity. 
Menger just considers one side of the human action: the mother’s embracement makes her son 
happy, the friend’s visit makes his mate happy. He does not consider the other dimension: a mutual 
love arises and strengthens in the embracement; a mutual friendship increases in the meeting. He 
considers the mother’s embracement a beneficial action, a good in an economic sense, increasing   5 
the son’s welfare or utility; the friend’s visit an human action increasing the other one’s welfare. He 
seems to apply his own “general theory of goods”. The mother’s embracement is a good for her son 
as it satisfies his need for love, it is suitable to satisfy it, it is recognized as such and is available. It 
is a free good, until it is scarce. As  a hypothesis, nothing prevents to conceive the same action, that 
is the embracement, also useful for the mother. Menger however does not consider any reciprocity. 
The actions of a single person are simply useful for the others. A lawyer performs an immaterial 
service, a working activity, useful for his customer. A mother performs an action, not a working 
activity, useful for her son. 
Menger distinguishes the goods into two classes: material goods  and useful actions and 
inactions. The second branch includes, beside working activities, human relationships:  “all goods 
can, I think, be divided into the two classes of material goods (including all forces of nature insofar 
they are goods) and of useful human actions (and inactions), the most important of which are labor 
services” (Menger 1871 [2004]: 55, original italics). 
For this, in Menger’s opinion, human relationships are goods in an economic sense. 
 
3.  Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk’s Theory of Relational Goods and the Epilogue of the Pure 
Austrian Attempt 
 
In  1881  Böhm-Bawerk,  pupil  of  Menger,  published  a  long  treatise,  called  Rechte  und 
Verhältnisse  vom  Standpunkte  der  volkswirtsaftlichen  Güterlehre  (translated  into  English  as 
Whether  Legal  Rights  And  Relationships  Are  Economic  Goods)
4.  A  “critical  study”  aimed  at 
establishing if “legal rights and relationships” are different goods adding to material goods and 
working activities.  
Böhm-Bawerk faces the same problem and the same authors as Menger: Hermann, Roscher, 
Schäffle
5. He distinguishes “legal rights” from “relationships”, which Menger included in the same 
term known as human “relationships”. 
Böhm’s thesis is that “rights and relationships” are goods from an economic viewpoint but 
they are not independent goods. 
                                                 
4 In the Publisher’s Preface to the English translation the following was written: “If the title were transliterated into 
English, it would be Legal Rights and Relationships from the Viewpoint of the Economics Doctrine of Goods”, see 
Böhm-Bawerk (1881 [1962]: 39). For a general introduction to the early writings of Böhm-Bawerk see Yagi (1983) and 
Grillo (2002). 
5 Böhm-Bawerk (1881 [1962]: 71) quotes Schäffle: “He begins his Theorie der ausschliessenden Absatzverhältinesse 
[Tübingen,  1864]  with  the  words:  “There  are  many  teachers  and  not  a  few  students  of  economics  who  become 
astonished and incredulous when they are told in their earliest and very fundamental discussions of economics that two 
categories of objects which are the object of economic exchange comprise (1) material, concrete things and (2) personal 
services; but that in addition to these two, and coordinate with them, there exists also that third category of economic 
goods which Hermann introduced into economic science under the name of ‘relationships’ and which since his day, 
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   6 
In 1871 Menger was afraid that economics would be applied to a limited field. Ten years 
later, Böhm-Bawerk (1881 [1962]: 67-68, original italics) feared the opposite, that is the field could 
become too large. The risk was to take into consideration too many goods, and that they could be 
counted many a time: 
 
And thus the things that achieved varyingly general recognition as being worthy of 
classification as intangible goods included such things as personal services, love, 
the organized state, the church, virtue, character [as a means to the establishment 
of  credit]  [MacLeod],  honor,  investors’  patents,  the  Iliad  [Rossi],  the  security 
bestowed by the law, monopolies, the joy of demolition [De Augustinis; quoted by 
Roscher  in  Grundlagen,  p.  106],  counsel  and  advice,  good  health,  strength, 
cleverness,  “good  sense,”  knowledge,  good  taste,  companionability,  freedom, 
ownership,  morality,  the  relationship  of  a  commanding  officer  to  his  soldiers 
[Roscher], credit [MacLeod], claims [Hufeland and Roscher], the “utilizations of a 
good” [Hermann] and, in  general, relationships of whatever kind and many other 
such things. 
  The merest glance at this list will suffice to convince us that not everything 
on it deserves rating as a good in the economic sense. Some sifting is indubitably 
required. But what is to be the acid test that we must apply on our selection? 
 
 
In those years Böhm was engaged in the composition of his opus magnum: Capital and 
Interest.  A  Critical  History  of  Economical  Theory.  He  considers  his  treatise  on  “rights  and 
relationships” foreshadowing his major work: an explanation of the nature of goods, necessary as an 
anticipation of the study of the most controversial good, that is capital and its reward. Böhm fears, 
in particular, the spreading of MacLeod’s theory, according to which credit is a good different from 
the goods upon which it is exerted. In this perspective, credit is an activity creating real goods, not 
only transferring them. He is afraid of John Law’s mistakes. 
 Ten  years after Menger, the danger is the multiplication of economic  goods, under the 
strong influence of Say’s theory of immaterial services and the legal doctrine of res corporales and 
res incorporales. Credits or claims are on sale on the market, have a price of their own, and they 
take the appearance of real economic goods. Böhm writes: 
 
It would seem that, in addition to material goods and personal services the things 
that have the best right to advance a claim to membership among the things that 
have economic goods-quality are those legal rights and relationships of which it 
can be observed that they play an independent part in economic exchange and in 
legal transactions. Claims are conveyed, rental rights are bought at a price, namely, 
the  rent  that  is  paid.  Goodwill  often  attains  very  real  money  value,  no  matter 
whether it depends on purely factual circumstances (such as the high repute of a 
firm’s  name)  or  on  specific  legal  rights  (such  as  patent  rights  or  a  granted 
monopoly) (Böhm-Bawerk (1881 [1962]: 70, original italics). 
    7 
 
Böhm, in order to solve the question, applies Menger’s general theory of goods. He even 
adds a fifth requisite: the power to utilize the thing. An individual feels the need for culture, which 
the book can satisfy, the individual recognizes its ability and disposes of it. But, if he cannot read, 
the book is not a good for him. As we have seen, Menger classed the goods as “material goods” and 
“useful human actions (and inactions)”. Böhm corrects his master: he just eliminates the category of 
“useful inactions” and substitutes actions by “useful renditions”. In economics, he says, only useful 
renditions  deserve  consideration,  also  because  it  would  be  impossible  to  keep  account  of  all 
potential  useful  inactions.  The  doctor  in  Menger’s  example,  in  order  to  become  a  monopolist, 
should benefit not only of his former rival’s retirement but also of the withdrawal of all those who, 
potentially, could exert a medical activity in that district. The new classification includes “material 
goods” and “personal and real renditions of service”. 
In Menger’s theory, goods are things useful to satisfy needs, that is suitable for achieving 
ends. Böhm distinguishes the “new goods” into two great groups, the first of which is inclusive of 
goods that are not means to attain a goal, since they are themselves a goal. Under this category fall 
moral and religious goods as well as happiness. He writes: “Preeminent among such things are 
ethical, religious and many other kinds of “spiritual goods”, such as virtue, happiness, contentment, 
peace of mind, and the like” (Böhm-Bawerk (1881 [1962]:  61). 
The second group comprises goods that enable to reach a goal, without falling under a third 
category of  goods independent on material products and useful renditions. This group includes 
“legal rights and relationships”. 
Böhm examines first rights and then relationships. 
Jurists traditionally distinguish patrimonial rights into real (from Latin res) and obligation 
and credit rights. Böhm uses another classification adhering more closely to the economic theory of 
goods. 
Goods  are  first  of  all  distinguished  into  non-durable  (or  consumables)  and  durable  (or 
unconsumable). The former exhaust their utility in a single time (a glass of wine). The latter consist 
and may be subdivided into a series of useful renditions. A field, for example, is a durable good, 
offering a series of useful services: it can be tilled, left without cultivations, used for building, or for 
rearing or passing. In the same way, a worker (a lawyer) offers a series of useful personal renditions 
(legal advice).  Non-durable goods offer a single performance, while durable goods offer multiple 
performances. 
Goods are then divided into “present” (a field, a house), and “future” ones (next summer’s 
crop, next year’s income).   8 
Finally, according to the economic theory of goods, he distinguishes patrimonial rights into: 
“property right”, “rights of partial utilization” and “rights to future yield of goods”. 
Now, Böhm is able to establish if patrimonial rights are economics goods. 
The right, that is the capacity to enjoy and dispose of a good, can be exerted on present, 
future goods and on the single renditions of which they consist. The proprietor is entitled to the 
“total” use of the good: the proprietor of a field, for example, can till it, leave it without cultivation, 
sell it, donate it. The owners of rights of “partial” utilizations can on the contrary enjoy some 
renditions of present goods: the usufructuary can take the fruit, but he must respect the original 
economic destination of the good, the owner of the right of superficies can build a house on a piece 
of ground belonging to others, and so on. Finally, the owners of rights to “future” yield of goods 
can in advance enjoy future goods: among these are included mutuum loans, pledge contracts, rights 
of inheritance, patent rights, copyrights and authors’ royalties. 
Patrimonial  rights  entitle  individuals  to  enjoy  and  dispose,  totally  or  partially,  of  the 
personal and material renditions of which present and future goods consist. But they are not new 
goods. They are just the legal projection of real goods. Böhm writes: “If it be true that rights were 
seriously considered to be things (and by “seriously” I mean without any awareness that men were 
indulging in a figure of speech) then it can only be said that men were allowing themselves to be 
deceived by shadows, as it were. In a sense, rights are shadows – the juridical shadows which real 
corporeal goods cast upon the image of our wealth. For where there is no corporeal object to which 
a right pertains, there can be no right” (Böhm-Bawerk (1881 [1962]: 148, original italics). 
The sixth chapter of the treatise is called  An Analysis Of “Relationships” As “Goods”. One 
century before Nussbaum (1986), known as the first scholar to introduce the phrase and a theory of 
relational goods, Böhm uses it, maybe taking it from Hermann and  Schäffle
6.  
After “ legal rights”, come “relationships”. 
Böhm analyses respectively “goodwill” (Schäffle), “State” (Roscher), “friendship and love” 
(Hermann).  He  applies  the  same  theory  and  comes  to  the  same  conclusion  achieved  in  the 
examination of rights: relationships consist of material products and useful personal and material 
renditions. They are  goods, in the economic sense, but are not independent goods, different or 
additional according to the original ones. 
The  goodwill  is  the  anticipation  of  a  future  profit.  The  shopkeeper,  when  selling  the 
goodwill, he actually sells the future goods produced by the firm, that is he calculates the present 
value of a future revenue. Böhm, differently from Menger, does not consider goodwill as different 
from material goods (present and future): “Whenever a previous proprietor of a business has sold 
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his “good will” or his “firm name” to a successor and purchaser, it is obviously the hoped-for future 
profits, arising out of exchange transactions (i.e., sales), arising by reason of the existence of the 
relationships of good will which both parties to the contract are dealing in – one deliberately parting 
with them, the other deliberately acquiring them” (Böhm-Bawerk (1881 [1962]: 156). 
State  corresponds  to  the  complex  of  useful  personal  renditions  (of  judges,  teachers, 
servicemen …) and materials (streets, bridges, schools …) offered to the community: “It would 
probably be impossible to think up any economic advantage emanating from the “state” which 
could not be allocated to one or the other of the foregoing two sources or to some interaction of 
either with the other” (Böhm-Bawerk (1881 [1962]: 171). 
Finally, relationships. Böhm writes: 
The same thing is true of the relationships of love and friendship, of family 
and of other kindred “relationship-goods.” And with those I wish to conclude my 
“testing by sample.” In this field, too, we can easily convince ourselves that every 
useful promotion of well-being which we derive from these sources consists, in 
actual truth, of nothing but beneficial renditions of service, predominantly personal 
ones but also of material nature, renditions that are given and received and that may 
often,  to  be  sure,  be  a  highly  intellectual  and  delicate  nature  but  that  are, 
nevertheless, genuine renditions of service in the economic sense. Of course, we 
feel a certain reluctance to think of the influences of such tender relationships in 
terms  of  economic  acts.  But  if  we  undertake  a  theoretical  examination  of  the 
sources of our well-being, we cannot but recognize the truly useful element when it 
is present, even in this area, in personal and material renditions of service, nor can 
we do aught but recognize that, from the economic viewpoint, such “goods” as 
family, church, love and the like are merely linguistic disguises for a totality of 
concretely useful renditions of service (Böhm-Bawerk (1881 [1962]: 173, original 
italics). 
 
Relational goods consist of “useful personal and material renditions”. They are goods in an 
economic  sense,  as  they  satisfy  a  specific  relational  need.  But  they  are  not  independent  good 
compared with the original ones. The need for friendship or love finds its satisfaction by personal 
and material renditions. 
Notice the reference to renditions “given and received”, a term that seems to be inclusive of 
reciprocity but, in my opinion, actually regards services separately “given” and “received” by an 
individual. Basically, Böhm writes: “We have  disencumbered the economic goods concept of a 
whole category of pseudo-goods. It was a mistake to regard rights and relationships as goods in and 
of themselves, or as goods which existed beside and in addition to the categories of material goods 
and services” (Böhm-Bawerk (1881 [1962]: 173-174, original italics). 
Both  Menger  and  Böhm  consider  relationships  in  Menger’s  sense,  that  is  inclusive  of 
relational goods as goods from an economic viewpoint. Goods to satisfy a human need. In Menger’s 
opinion, they are independent goods belonging, beside “material products”, to the class of “human   10 
useful actions (and inactions)”. In that category we can see, along with working activities, useful 
actions  (and  inactions)  of  friends  and  lovers.  Böhm,  on  the  contrary,  finds  that  they  are  not 
independent  and  original  goods,  but  they  consist  of  “useful  personal  and  material  renditions”. 
Within that category we do not find those goods named goodwill, state, love, friendship. They are 
essentially “linguistic disguises”:  a lot of useful renditions. We can insulate a series of useful 
material renditions (the present value of future goods) and call it “goodwill”. We can insulate a 
series  of  useful  personal  renditions  (a  meeting  …)  and  material  (a  present  …)  and  call  it 
“friendship”, or a series of useful personal renditions (teachers …) and material (school building) 
and call it “State”. But we cannot add new goods called goodwill, friendship, State to renditions: 
this would mean to make the mistake of giving different names to the same good. 
 Original goods, in Böhm’s view, are only “material products” and “useful personal and 
material renditions”.  
In  his  Capital  and  Interest,  published  in  1884,  Böhm  regrets  the  lack  of  consideration 
reserved to his work of 1881. A disappointment that he also expresses in the third edition of 1914, 
two months before he dies. He writes: “Singularly enough, this attempt of mine stands almost alone 
in  economic  literature.  I  say  “singularly  enough”  deliberately,  for  it  does  seem  to  me  a  very 
wonderful  thing  that,  in  a  science  which  from  beginning  to  end  turns,  as  on  its  axis,  on  the 
satisfying of need by means of goods, – on the relation of use between men and goods, – no inquiry 
has ever been made into the technical character of the use of goods” (Böhm-Bawerk (1884 [1890]: 
218). 
On Böhm’s death, the old master writes his obituary. Menger observes, about the treatise of 
1881, that Böhm’s attempt “has found in the corporation of economists a not unanimous consensus 
owing to the evident artificial structure of his theory and especially because of the conflict between 
Böhm’s fundamental view and experience. The most evident proof – according to Menger (1915 
[2002]: 317 my translation from Italian edition) – is “that, when one sells a brand, a patent, a 
goodwill their prices are calculated independent of the price of material goods connected with them 
(fields,  buildings,  machinery,  inventory  goods  etc.)”.  Menger,  however,  seems  to  refer  just  to 
present goods and not to future ones. 
 In 1921, Menger dies too. In 1923 the second edition of  Principles of Economics, edited by 
his son Karl was published. An edition that was found doubtful by many scholars. The question of 
“relationships”  is  confined  to  a  footnote.  Menger  (1923  [1925]:  16  my  translation  from  Italian 
edition) writes:  
  
Basically, mixing ethical with economical viewpoints …, some economists have 
come to accept such goods, like God as “supreme good”, virtues, honor and so on,   11 
although they cannot be considered as such from an economic viewpoint. In the 
same  way,  love,  friendship,  devotion  etc.,  that  are  granted  to  us  free,  are  not 
available means to satisfy the needs of an economic entity, and therefore they are 
not goods but free manifestations of personality. 
 
Now Menger seems to consider that love and friendship cannot be considered goods in an 
economic sense, as not available. The last requisite of his “general theory of goods” comes to fail. 
The above quoted sentence is not clear. It is possible to think that those goods are not as available as 
the  others.  An  individual  cannot  get  them.  He  can  just  receive  them  free.  They  are  “free 
manifestations” of the other’s personality. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  twenties,  almost  silently,  relational  goods  are  excluded  from 
economics, becoming the exclusive subject of moral and philosophical sciences. 
 
4.  The Development of the Anglo-Austrian Theory: from Wicksteed to Robbins 
In 1910 Philip Henry Wicksteed (1844-1927), born in Leeds in Yorkshire and parson of the 
Unitarian Church, publishes The Common Sense of Political Economy. In the fifth chapter, called  
“Business and economic nexus”, he exposes a theory of economic relationships which, in another 
way compared with that followed by Menger and Böhm-Bawerk, excludes relational goods from 
economic analysis. Wicksteed, following a path of his own, elaborates an approach similar to the 
Austrian one: Kirzner (1999) calls him “the British Austrian”
7. 
According to Wicksteed, economic relationships are in themselves purely instrumental and 
neutral: instrumental as  they serve to  acquire, by  means of exchange acts, goods  and services; 
neutral  as  the  goods  acquired  can  be  used  for  both  selfish  and  altruistic  ends.  They  can  be 
egoistically accumulated or generously donated. Not instrumental relationships (or pure) are not 
economic ones
8.  
Wicksteed suggests several examples. A mother buys potatoes at the market to serve them to 
her sons. The first relationship is purely neutral and instrumental, that is economical. The mother is 
inspired by an altruistic purpose: to feed her sons. She could also be inspired by the desire to give 
the poor her savings accumulated thanks to a wise policy of expenditure. The mother is potentially 
                                                 
7 On Wicksteed see Robbins (1933) and Kirzner (1999). Kirzner (1999: 101-102) wrote: “Philip Wicksteed has, at least 
doctrinally, been identified with the Austrian tradition. Perhaps for this very reason, however, we should, at the outset 
of a discussion of the Austrian character of Wicksteed’s work, emphasize that, whatever the strength of  Wicksteed’s 
Austrian  doctrinal  credentials,  he  was  not  a  member  of  the  Austrian  School  in  the  usual  sense.  This  British 
contemporary of Menger, Böhm-Bawerk, and Wieser appears to have had no direct contact or correspondence with any 
of them … The elements in Wicksteed’s work which we shall identify as “Austrian” were, it is well-recognized, the 
outcome of his own careful elaboration of the insights he discovered in the work of that other British “Austrian,” 
William Stanley Jevons”. 
8  In this part I have accepted the interpretation of Wicksteed’s thought proposed by Bruni (2006: 113-118).   12 
altruistic  to  everyone,  except  to  the  greengrocer:  to  everyone,  except  to  him.  If  she  also  were 
altruistic to the seller, the relationship would not be economical any more. 
Another example. Saint Paul used to sell tents. In that activity too, he was inspired by an 
altruistic purpose. He wished, by his profits, to help the others and not to accumulate treasures for 
himself. He was altruistic to everyone, except to those who bought tents. If he had been the same 
with them too, the relationship would no longer have been economical. 
In economical relationships, an individual can be inspired either by a selfish or an altruistic 
motivation. He can either be an egoist or an altruist to everyone, except to the person with whom he 
establishes the relationship: to everyone, but not to you, who are my counterpart. The nature of 
economic relationships is determined neither by egoism nor by altruism, but by what Wicksteed 
(1910: 180), creating a neologism, calls “non-tuism”: “it would be just as true, and just as false, to 
say  that  the  business  motives  ignores  egoistic  as  to  say  that  it  ignores  altruistic  impulses.  The 
specific characteristic of an economic relation is not its “egoism”, but its “non-tuism””. 
It would be absurd to say that the mother buying potatoes at the least price is an egoist, as 
well as Saint Paul selling his tents at the maximum price. What defines their actions is the last (or 
the  first)  goal  inspiring  them.  But  in  this  way,  Wicksteed  actually  excludes  non-instrumental 
relationships  from  the  ground  of  economics.  As  Bruni  (2006:  117)  writes:  “Wicksteed’s  good 
intention  of  freeing  Economics  from  egoism  and  hedonism  brought  him  to  expel  personalised 
interpersonal relations from economic enquires: the domain of economic analyses becomes that 
characterised from purely anonymous interactions, and is therefore instrumental”. 
In 1933 Robbins edited a new edition of Common Sense and of other selected papers by 
Wicksteed. In 1935 he publishes the second and definite edition of his famous Essay on the Nature 
and  Significance  of  Economic  Science,  where  he  systematizes  the  methodology  still  in  use  in 
contemporary economics
9. 
Economics is the science concerning the choices of men, when they are in a condition of 
scarcity, that is when they dispose of means scarce and usable for alternative uses, in order to 
achieve aims of different importance. At first, relational goods (even if Robbins does not use this 
term) are not economic goods. But, in a second phase, they could become as such. 
                                                 
9 On Robbins’s Austrian connection, O’Brien (1990: 179-180, original italics) wrote: “The Austrian connection in 
Robbins’s work is thus important, but it is not exclusive of other influences or completely overwhelming … But if 
limited, it is nonetheless important. Quite clearly it significantly affected Robbins’s own view of writers other than the 
Austrians. It was an Austrian perspective which he adopted in synthesizing, in the interwar period, that corpus of 
economic theory to which he attached such importance. As he read the Austrians’ works, he found in them not only 
elements which coincided with that he had already learned from Wicksteed but also insights which enabled him to see 
what was essential to Wicksteed and what could be dispensed with in the building up of an authoritative treatment of 
microeconomics”. On this topic see now Howson (2004). On the reception of Robbins’s Essay see Backhouse and 
Medema (2007). 
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 Robbins defines the four conditions of scarcity in a very detailed way. Two of them concern 
the ends and two the means: the ends must be various and classifiable as to importance, the means 
(and time) scarce and usable for alternative destinations. If even one of the four conditions is not 
fulfilled, there is no scarcity and the economic problem of having to choose other ends instead of 
others  does  not  arise.  But,  if  the  four  conditions  simultaneously  occur,  then  we  can  speak  of 
scarcity. In this case, as we dispose of insufficient instruments, we are bound to make a choice of 
the goals we want to reach, according to a certain hierarchy. 
 Ones’ ends can be either mean or noble, material or immaterial, egoistic or altruistic. There 
are not – says Robbins – economic purposes, but only economic or non economic ways to achieve 
the desired goals: “So far as we are concerned, our economic subjects can be pure egoists, pure 
altruists, pure ascetics, pure sensualists or – what is much more likely – mixed bundles of all these 
impulses” (Robbins (1935 [1945]: 95).  
The economist accepts purposes as given. Robbins gives the example of a community of 
sybarites then converted by a Savonarola. At the beginning, they wish to satisfy sensual pleasures: 
the scarce available resources are mainly due to produce food and wine. After their conversion, the 
hierarchy of ends changes: the sybarites become hermits and wish to satisfy the pleasures of their 
souls. What does not vary is the economic analysis. The economist observes that just the relative 
scarcity of goods has altered. At the time of conversion, less wine and more stones for ecclesiastical 
buildings begin to be produced: the rent coming from wines decreases and the one of quarries 
increases.   
   At first, Robbins affirms, it is advisable to make a sharp distinction between means and 
ends. Work is a means useful to obtain the resources necessary to achieve the desired purposes. 
Goals may be of different kinds: material or spiritual, egoistic or altruistic, that is to support ones 
family  or  live  as  a  debauché.  But  the  economic  relationship  with  his  employer  is  merely  
instrumental: it just tends to obtain the means suitable to achieve the ends. The worker chooses the 
employer offering  the highest wages. Then he will decide whether to support his family or to live 
as a debauché. It will be just then that we will be able to understand if he is egoist or altruist. The 
economical relationship between worker and employer is not a good in itself. Robbins does not 
quote Wicksteed, but it is clear that he is applying his “non-tuism”. He writes: 
 
This, then, is all that lies behind the homo oeconomicus – the occasional assumption 
that in certain exchange relationships all the means, so to speak, are on one side and 
all the ends on the other. If, e.g., for purposes of demonstrating the circumstances in 
which  a  single  price  will  emerge  in  a limited  market, it is  assumed that in my 
dealings in that market I always buy from the cheapest seller, it is not assumed at all 
that I am necessarily actuated by egotistical motives. On the contrary, it is well   14 
known that the impersonal relationship postulated is to be seen in its purest form 
when  trustees,  not  being  in  a  position  to  allow  themselves  the  luxury  of  more 
complicated relationships, are trying to make the best terms for the estates they 
administer: your business man is a much more complicated fellow. All that it means 
is that my relation to the dealers does not enter into my hierarchy of ends. For me 
(who may be acting for myself or my friends or some civic or charitable authority) 
they are regarded merely as means. Or, again, if it is assumed … that I sell my 
labour always in the dearest market, it is not assumed that money and self-interest 
are  my  ultimate  objects  –  I  may  be  working  to  support  some  philanthropic 
institution. It is assumed only that, so far as that transaction is concerned, my labour 




But this is just the first step that after being taken can be left behind. In the second step, we 
can  assume  that  the  worker  chooses  to  work,  even  at  inferior  wages,  in  a  firm  he  finds  more 
homely. The sharp distinction between means and ends can be forgotten. Human work becomes, 
thus, an end too. More exactly, in economic relationships, double ends and means coexist. The two 
purposes are: to support one’s family and to work in a happy atmosphere. Human relationship 
becomes in this way a good satisfying a specific need for well-being in the working milieu and 
involving the partial renunciation to alternative ends that could be achieved with higher wages. 
Relational goods, even if Robbins does not use this term, return to being considered economic 
goods. He writes: “If this were commonly known, if it were generally realised that Economic Man 
is  only  an  expository  device  –  a  first  approximation  used  very  cautiously  at  one  stage  in  the 
development of arguments which, in their full development, neither employ any such assumption 
nor demand it in any way for a justification of their procedure – it is improbable that he would be 
such a universal bogey” (Robbins 1935 [1945]: 97). And in addition: “Now the valuations which 
determine particular transactions may be of various degrees of complexity. In my purchase of bread 
I may be interested solely in the comparison between the bread and the other things in the circle of 
exchange on which I might have spent the money. But I may be interested too in the happiness of 
my baker. There may exist between us certain liens which make it preferable for me to buy bread 
from him, rather than procure it from his competitor who is willing to sell it a little cheaper. In 
exactly the same way, in my sale of my own labour or the hire of my property, I may be interested 
only in the things which I receive as a result of the transaction; or I may be interested also in the 
experience of laboring in one way rather than another, or in the prestige or discredit, the feeling of 
virtue or shame in hiring my property in this line rather than in that” (Robbins 1935 [1945]: 95). 
Robbins reopens the doors of the temple of economics to relational goods. 
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5.  Conclusions 
It is finally time to propose an answer to the question concerning this research, that is the 
place  of  the  Austrian  theory  on  relational  goods  in  the  history  of  the  relationships  between 
Economics and Happiness. 
First of all, I think I can say that it occupies an important place. Great Austrian economists, 
co-founders of modern economic science, investigate the nature of relational goods as sources of 
human welfare and consider them, even if with different various arguments, economic goods. 
Austrian  economists  do  not  directly  face  the  problem  of  the  relationships  between 
economics and happiness. Their writings do not contain pages or paragraphs dedicated to this topic. 
They  even  rather  rarely  use  the  word  happiness  and  do  not  bother  to  define  the  philosophical 
meaning of it referring to Aristotle or to the Enlightenment. They prefer to speak of human welfare: 
a comprehensive welfare, not limited to the satisfaction of material needs. The problem that they 
directly face is whether and in what sense non-instrumental human relationships can be considered 
and dealt with as economic goods increasing human welfare. In this way, they indirectly explore the 
theme of the relationships between economics and happiness. 
In his Principles of 1871 Menger considers non-instrumental human relationships as goods 
in an economic sense, since they satisfy the four requisites that change a thing into a good. He 
includes relational goods, beside material products, in the class comprising “useful human actions 
and  inactions”.  Ten  years  later,  in  1881,  Böhm-Bawerk  still  considers  non-instrumental  human 
relationships as good in an economic sense, but not independent or original goods. They are rather 
derived  goods,  made  by  “material  products”  and  “useful  material  and  personal  renditions”, 
composing the two only classes of original goods studied by economics. In the third edition of 
Capital and Interest, published in 1914, shortly before his death, Böhm recognizes that his attempt 
was  unsuccessful.  In  1923,  post  mortem,  Menger,  in  a  footnote  of  the  second  edition  of  his 
Principles, observes that relational goods are not goods in an economic sense, because they do not 
satisfy the last requisite: availability. The pure Austrian theory ends: from early Menger’s yes to the 
final Menger’s no. 
The  Anglo-Austrian  line  follows  a  different  path.  In  1910  Wicksteed  introduces  the 
hypothesis  of  non-tuism:  economics  just  inquiries  into  neutral  and  instrumental  human 
relationships. The human relationship is not an economic good in itself. In 1935, however, Robbins 
considers Wicksteed’s non-tuism  just a first approximation that, after being developed, can be left 
behind. In the second approximation, human relationships can be conceived as means capable to 
satisfy a goal of happiness. From Wicksteed’s no to Robbins’ yes.   16 
For this, in the time of marginalist revolution, Austrian economists develop a theory of 
relational goods, based on a more general theory of economic goods, connected to the theme of 
well-being generally understood. 
The history of economics in its connection with happiness has been written above all by 
Bruni and Zamagni. This history is divided into three phases, in their opinion. In the first one, the 
sun of happiness – just to use an image dear to them – shines in the sky of economics. Economics 
originated in the 18
th century, above all in the Italy of Genovesi, as the science of public happiness, 
directly investigating the problem of the transformation of wealth into happiness. Then, it develops 
in Britain, from Smith to Marshall, as the science of wealth, in the implicit assumption that wealth 
fosters human welfare. The second stage is that of eclipse, during which happiness disappears from 
the skyline of economics. The eclipse takes place in three successive moments. Bentham identifies 
happiness with utility. Economics becomes the calculation of pain and pleasure. The purpose of 
maximum happiness for most people corresponds to the maximum utility. Pareto states that it is not 
necessary to follow psychological concepts. Economics studies logical actions, that is the rational 
behaviour of individuals using scarce means in  order to  achieve different ends. The  economist 
reveals individual preferences ex-post without attributing a predetermined end to the actors: what 
the individual chooses is useful, not the opposite. Wicksteed finally reduces the research field of 
economics to the market, where only instrumental and neutral relationships are in force. The third 
and final stage, where we still are, begins in 1974 with the discovery, by Easterlin (1974), of the 
paradox of happiness: why does not wealth make people happier? Bruni and Zamagni (and others), 
recommencing from the contribution of the philosopher Nussbaum (1986) and of the economist Gui 
(1987),  answer:  it  is  because  individuals,  in  order  to  obtain  the  means  necessary  to  acquire 
consumer goods, get to destroy the relational goods on which happiness largely depends
10. 
They have the merit to have given a historical perspective to the big question of happiness in 
economics. This is an intriguing and entrancing story that allows us to rediscover authors of whom 
we thought to know everything. Their merit is also to have detected in non-tuism an idea that has 
largely darkened the issue of happiness in economics from Wicksteed on. But the eclipse is not 
total. Just in the time of marginalism, as we have seen, Austrian economists elaborated a theory of 
relational goods that is connected to the theme of happiness
11. 
Austrian theory is different from the modern one. The simultaneous reciprocity fails. In the 
modern theory the relational good is co-produced and co-consumed by the actors involved. For 
example, during a dinner among friends, an independent good we can call friendly relationship is 
                                                 
10 See in particular Bruni and Zamagni (2004) and Bruni (2006). Others historical contributions are in Nardi Spiller 
(2004) and Vivenza (2007). 
11 Bruni (2006: 143) only mentions the second edition of the Menger’s Principles.   17 
co-produced  and  co-consumed.  In  the  Austrian  theory,  on  the  contrary,  the  relational  good  is 
conceived as a unilateral useful action or rendition, that an actor does for himself or for the others. I 
prefer to work with you, even at lower wages, for the sake of my happiness. I prefer to buy my 
bread from that baker, even at a higher price, for the sake of his happiness. The action I do is aimed 
at my or at others’ happiness. We are beyond the field of non-tuism, but not yet in the domain of 
simultaneous reciprocity. According to the hypothesis of non-tuism, in fact, one can be altruist with 
everybody  excepting  those  with  whom  one  is  bargaining;  with  everyone  except  with  you.  The 
second approximation by Robbins reintroduces “tuism” into economics: I can buy my bread from 
that baker to make him happier.  
Maybe, we can connect the modern theory to the Austrian one by developing the second 
approximation  by  Robbins,  that  is  leaving  the  hard  distinction  between  means  and  ends,  and 
introducing  the logic of double means and double end. Some friends decide to set up together a 
cooperative company, accepting the idea of earning less. The double end is: to support their own 
families and to live a friendly relationship on duty. The double means is: the working performance 
and  the  friendly  relationship.  A  friendly  relationship  is  a  co-produced  and  co-consumed  good, 
distinct from one’s job, satisfying the need for friendship. 
Relational  goods,  in  my  opinion,  are  economical  only  if  they  satisfy  the  requisites  of 
Robbins’ means/ends scheme: at this point they have an opportunity cost leading individuals to 
make rational choices, that is to prefer certain ends to the disadvantage of others
12. 
                                                 
12 I will give two examples. The first is already used by many theorists of relational goods. A relational good – it was 
said – is a good in itself, it is a non-instrumental relationship, not aiming at the acquisition of an other good or service. 
A customer is willing to pay a barber a higher reward just because he finds him nice. In this case, it is not a relational 
good: reciprocity is missing. It is rather a differentiated product: the customer is open to pay more for the same service 
– the haircut – because he considers it as different and better. The barber is easy going and nice, because he considers 
this an aspect of his profession. This is an equivalent exchange: the haircut and courtesy against a monetary reward. 
After a while, the barber becomes a real friend and proposes a reduction   to his customer. The customer refuses. He 
fears some errors may arise. The barber could feel obliged to refuse an ordinary customer to give way to him. One 
account is the professional service, an other a friendly conversation. The introduction of an exterior motivation (money) 
can destroy inner motivation (friendship). The price does not vary, the service the same, but now simultaneous to 
professional performance, another good, called relational, is co-produced and co-consumed. A free good added to the 
market one. A non economic good, if it does not involve an opportunity cost. This second example is perhaps more 
significant. A father spends his Saturday afternoon with his son. This is a relational good. After a while, his son refuses. 
He has more interesting things to do. The good is no longer “available”. The father offers his son a ten euro incentive. It 
is no more a relational good. It becomes a market good: the exterior motivation destroys the inner one. Another variant: 
now it is the father, not the son, who is no longer available on Saturday afternoon because of too many business 
engagements. But one Saturday he realizes that his relationship with his son is too important and he is willing to give up 
rich legal advice to stay with him. The relational good can have an opportunity cost forcing one to choose certain goals 
and to renounce others. Generally speaking, to get a relational good, one can suffer an opportunity cost (both explicit 
and either implicit), but cannot pay a price. The father, to stay with his son, can suffer the cost (implicit) of giving up 
the legal advice and/or the cost (explicit) of buying an ice-cream. But he cannot pay a price. The payment of a price 
destroys the pure relational good. One can only buy relational pseudo-goods: chat lines, computer couplet, etc. The 
party asking for the good must pay. The opportunity cost, instead, strengthens  the gratuitousness of the pure relational 
goods: in order to have them, one is willing not only to receive nothing in exchange, but also to give up something. 
Relational goods become economic when they are scarce, that is when they involve an opportunity cost binding to make 
rational choices in the allocation of scarce resources usable for alternative ends. Finally, according to the traditional   18 
Relational  goods,  as  we  have  seen,  affect  the  human  welfare  to  such  an  extent  that, 
according to some scholars, their destruction reduces the happiness perceived by individuals. But 
even if the reality were different, and we were far from the critical point beyond which wealth does 
not make people happier, a question would remain valid on relational goods: has economics to 
inquire into non-instrumental human relationships? And how?    
The answer of Austrian economists is that economics has to take it into consideration, by 
applying  the  general  theory  of  goods  or  the  means/ends  scheme,  when  a  condition  of  scarcity 
imposing a rational choice arises.  
Surely, decades have elapsed, from Menger to Robbins, when economics has made huge 
progress also in the field of the relationships between wealth and happiness. Nowadays economics 
is passing through a new phase of enlargement, of methodological imperialism, during which we 
witness  the  duplication  of  goods  considered  economical:  private,  public,  common,  social, 
positional,  relational  …  Perhaps  it  may  be  useful  to  reflect  once  again  upon  the  first 
considerations  made  about  relational  goods  by  scholars  who  remain  giants  in  the  history  of 
economic thought. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
distinction  between  private  and  public  goods,  the  relational  one  can  be  considered  as  a  mixed  good  having  the 
characteristics of anti-rivalry in consumption and excludability. The well-being of a person gets bigger and bigger as 
civil, friendly and family relationships expand and deepen, whereas it is always possible to exclude someone from 
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THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL ON HAPPINESS AND RELATIONAL GOODS 
 
Austrian economists do not directly face the problem of the relationships between economics 
and happiness. They even rather rarely use the word happiness and do not bother to define the 
philosophical meaning of it referring to Aristotle or to the Enlightenment. They prefer to speak of 
human welfare: a comprehensive welfare, not limited to the satisfaction of material needs. The 
problem that they directly face is whether and in what sense non-instrumental human relationships 
(that is relational goods) can be considered and dealt with as economic goods increasing human 
welfare. In this way, they indirectly explore the theme of the relationships between economics and 
happiness. 
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